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The	practice	of	legislators	drawing	election	districts	for	partisan	advantage,	also	known	
as	“Gerrymandering,”	could	either	end	in	June	2018	or	it	could	get	much	worse.	The	case	of	Gill	
v.	Whitford	heard	by	the	Supreme	Court	in	October	raises	a	question	that	strikes	at	the	heart	of	
American	values:	is	drawing	election	districts	for	partisan	advantage	unconstitutional?	Or,	more	
precisely:	does	a	single-party	controlled	state	legislature	violate	the	Equal	Protection	Clause	
and	the	First	Amendment	rights	of	association	and	free	speech	of	voters	of	the	minority	party	
by	drafting	a	redistricting	plan	that	systematically	and	durably	dilutes	the	voting	strength	of	
those	voters?	The	United	States	District	Court	in	the	western	district	of	Wisconsin	believes	so,	
and	a	decision	by	the	Supreme	Court	is	due	on	appeal	this	coming	June.		
The	issue	of	partisan	gerrymandering	in	the	United	States	has	a	complicated	history.	The	
practice	dates	back	even	further	than	a	failed	attempt	by	Anti-Federalists	in	Virginia	to	take	
James	Madison’s	seat	in	the	House	of	Representatives	in	1788.	The	first	legal	claim	against	a	
legislative	redistricting	plan	of	any	kind	that	was	accepted	by	the	Supreme	Court	was	when	one	
district	had	ten-times	the	population	of	another	district,	and	thus	one-tenth	of	the	voting	
power.	Racial	gerrymandering	was	addressed	shortly	thereafter	by	the	Supreme	Court	and	
Congress	in	the	passage	of	the	Voting	Rights	Act,	developing	the	doctrine	of	“one-person,	one-
vote”.	It	was	not	until	1986	that	the	Court	found	partisan	gerrymandering	to	be	under	the	
Court’s	purview	of	justiciability.	However,	the	Justices	could	not	agree	upon	a	standard	through	
which	to	conclude	“how	much”	partisan	consideration	is	required	for	a	court	to	find	a	map	
unconstitutional.	Thirty	years	later,	this	question	remains	unanswered	today.	Justice	Kennedy	
had	the	deciding	vote	in	Vieth	v.	Jubelier	in	2006,	allowing	partisan	gerrymandering	claims	to	
possibly	remain	justiciable,	but	still	holding	out	for	a	“limited	and	precise”	standard	in	
evaluating	those	claims.	
Gill	v.	Whitford	is	a	case	where	a	professor	at	the	University	of	Wisconsin	sued	the	Chair	
of	the	State	Election	Board	for	disproportionately	reducing	the	voting	power	of	Democrats	in	
Wisconsin	through	partisan	gerrymandering.	Following	the	2010	census,	the	Republican-
controlled	Wisconsin	legislature	hired	experts	to	draw	the	map	that	would	strategically	benefit	
the	Republicans	the	most	in	the	coming	elections.	The	plaintiffs	asserted	a	fervently	contested	
social	metric	called	the	“Efficiency	Gap”	in	order	to	measure	partisan	gerrymandering.	The	
District	Court	sided	with	the	plaintiff,	accepting	the	Efficiency	Gap	and	its	surrounding	legal	test	
as	the	limited	and	precise	standard	the	Kennedy	sought	in	Vieth.	The	significance	of	this	case,	
as	opposed	to	similar	cases	in	the	past,	lies	with	the	progress	in	technology	informing	the	
legislators	in	drawing	maps	for	partisan	advantage.	Furthermore,	this	case	is	likely	to	be	the	last	
partisan	gerrymandering	case	to	be	heard	before	the	Supreme	Court	before	maps	are	redrawn	
following	the	2020	census.		
This	research	analyzes	the	arguments	and	likely	outcomes	of	Gill	v.	Whitford	through	
Supreme	Court	precedent,	briefs	for	each	of	the	parties,	briefs	amici	curiae,	and	other	related	
academic	articles.	The	Efficiency	Gap	Chief	Justice	Roberts	referred	to	as	“sociological	
gobbledygook”	may	actually	provide	the	desired	quantitative	feature	of	a	standard	test	through	
which	courts	can	evaluate	the	constitutionality	of	partisan	gerrymanders	which	was	adopted	by	
the	District	Court	and	restated	by	Justice	Breyer	at	oral	argument.	This	research	further	argues	
that	even	though	such	a	standard	could	be	a	reasonable	solution	to	resolving	partisan	
gerrymandering	claims,	plaintiffs	should	only	need	to	prove	that	a	legislature	intended	to	dilute	
voting	power	based	on	their	political	viewpoint.	
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